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Abstract
In this essay, I analyze the three most prominent views 
regarding the philosophy of perception- direct realism, indirect 
realism, and ideal realism. I consider two relevant problems 
of perception, specifically the existence of hallucinations and 
perceptual relativity, and to what extent they are problematic 
for these views on perception. I first argue that direct realism, 
the view typically referred to as ‘common-sense realism’, is 
in fact far from common-sense. Although direct realists hold 
the common-sense view that we directly perceive physical 
objects, they are forced to hold the absurd view that we do 
not know what physical objects look, smell, taste, sound, or 
feel like. Further, they can never know if their perceptions 
are ontologically mind dependent or not. I then argue that 
although indirect realism is supposed to bypass the epistemic 
problems of perception bogging the direct realist down, its 
epistemic issues are at least as severe. Worse, an indirect realist 
cannot explain how an unperceived physical object could 
produce sensible qualities, and as such suffers from mind-
body epistemic problems. I then argue that ideal realism, the 
view that physical objects cannot exist unperceived, is the most 
consistent and least problematic view regarding the philosophy 
of perception. I conclude that we should accept ideal realism as 
probably true on the basis of epistemic reasons alone. 
Introduction 
 The primary focus of the philosophy of perception 
is to understand the ontological nature of what it is that we 
perceive by sense. There are three main views regarding what 
the ontological nature of sense experience is, being direct 
realism, indirect realism, and ideal realism. Direct realism is 
the view that “perception is an immediate or direct awareness 
of mind-independent physical objects or events in the external 
world.” The term ‘mind-independent physical objects’ is 
synonymous with ‘material objects’. The traditional proponent 
of direct realism was Thomas Reid. Indirect realism is the view 
that perception is an immediate or direct awareness of mind-
dependent non-physical representations of mind-independent 
physical objects, and mediate or indirect awareness of mind-
independent physical objects or events in the physical world. 
The term ‘mind-dependent non-physical representations 
of mind-independent physical objects’ is synonymous with 
‘sense data’. The traditional proponents of indirect realism 
were Rene Descartes, and John Locke. Ideal realism is the 
view that perception is an immediate or direct awareness of 
mind-dependent physical objects or events. For an ideal realist, 
physical objects cannot exist unperceived, and the term ‘mind-
dependent physical objects’ is synonymous with ‘sensations’. 
The most notable ideal realist was Bishop George Berkeley.
 In this essay, I argue that ideal realism is the most 
consistent view regarding the philosophy of perception. I 
begin by defining ‘perceived by sense’, and consequently 
provide other important definitions. I proceed to argue that 
direct realism, if true, commits its holders to radical epistemic 
skepticism. I then argue that indirect realism if true commits 
its holders to radical epistemic skepticism. Lastly, I argue that 
ideal realism is more epistemically consistent than direct and 
indirect realis. I conclude that we should accept ideal realism as 
probably right.
Definitions
 I understand whatever that is perceived by sense as 
properly perceived by sense, or proper objects of the senses, 
following Aristotle and George Berkeley. I define what is 
properly perceived by sense as irreducibly phenomenal, wholly 
perceptible qualities that “would have been perceived if that 
same sense had then been first conferred on us”, and things 
that are properly perceived are perceived by only one sense. 
Colors/light are thus the only proper objects of vision, sounds 
of hearing, tastes of the palate, odors of smell, and heat/
hardness/solidity of touch. Proper objects of the senses are 
also immediately perceived by the senses, and by immediately 
perceived by the senses I mean perceived without being 
perceived via suggestion, and without being inferred to exist. 
Something is perceived via suggestion if we perceive it in virtue 
of it having some habitual connection grounded on experience 
with something we immediately perceive. For example, upon 
immediately hearing the word “red”, the color red may present 
itself to our imagination. But, the color red is not perceived 
immediately by hearing, rather it is mediately apprehended 
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in virtue of the word we immediately hear, which we’ve come 
to associate with the visual color red through experience. 
Whatever is perceived via suggestion from wholly perceptible 
qualities which we immediately perceive by sense I define 
as mediately perceived. What we properly and immediately 
perceive by the senses can suggest notions (like emotions, truth, 
God, mind, and virtue) which though we’ve never properly 
and immediately perceived them, we have an understanding 
of what they are in virtue of their definitions or use in linguistic 
convention. Otherwise, what we properly and immediately 
perceive can suggest something we have previously properly and 
immediately perceived by the senses (like a sound or color), to the 
imagination- which is where all sensible things are represented- 
due to a frequently experienced connection between sensible 
qualities and notions, or between sensible qualities and other 
sensible qualities. 
From that which we properly and immediately perceive 
by the senses, we can infer the cause of our sensible qualities 
through the use of reason. Thus for a direct and indirect realist, 
they will infer that a material object is the cause of their sensible 
qualities, while for an ideal realist, they will infer some mind 
is the cause of their sensible qualities. The sensible qualities 
previously properly and immediately perceived by sense that 
are suggested to the imagination by current proper objects 
of the sense can be termed improper objects of the sense. 
Those improper objects of the sense are mediately perceived 
by sense. When we properly perceive or hear the word ‘red’ 
by sound, it may suggest to the imagination an improper 
object of sound which is some visual quality we term as red, 
though the proper object of sound is strictly what is properly 
and immediately heard. In like manner, when we see fire, in 
strictness we properly and immediately perceive only colors, 
the heat we associate with the fire is suggested to our mind 
through experience. Thus, the hotness of the fire is an improper 
object of sight, being only suggested to the imagination through 
experience, and is a proper object of touch, being felt only 
properly, and immediately by sense. Things that are perceived 
wholly by the imagination, being not suggested or inferred 
to exist, are immediately perceived by the imagination. For 
example, when I imagine a red balloon existing in front of 
my face, it is not suggested or inferred to exist, and is thus 
immediately perceived, not be sense, but by the imagination.
Physical objects must be defined such that it is agreeable 
to all three views regarding the philosophy of perception. 
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The term ‘physical object’ are often conflated with ‘material 
object’, and even often are discussed hand-in-hand: “while 
‘physicalism’ is no doubt related to ‘physics’ it is also related 
to ‘physical object’ and this in turn is very closely connected 
with ‘material object’, and via that, with ‘matter.’” My definition 
of physical objects involves two important parts. First, 
physical objects occupy the area of extended space perceived 
immediately by sense. Second, the existence of physical objects 
are not ontologically dependent on the existence of other 
physical objects. 
Physical objects occupy the mediate area of extended 
space perceived by sense, and their existence is not 
ontologically dependent on the existence of other physical 
objects for indirect realists. Sense data occupy the immediate 
area of extended space perceived by sense for indirect realists, 
but their existence is ontologically dependent on the existence 
of physical objects, and thus sense data are not physical objects. 
Physical objects occupy the immediate area of extended space 
perceived by sense, and their existence is not ontologically 
dependent on the existence of other physical objects for direct 
realists and ideal realists. For an ideal realist, however, the 
existence of physical objects is ontologically dependent on the 
existence of minds. It should be noted that objects perceived 
by the imagination are not perceived by sense, thus though I 
can imagine a red balloon occupying the visual space in front 
of me, it is perceived wholly by the imagination. I think it will 
be agreed upon on all hands that this is a neutrally acceptable 
definition of ‘physical objects’.
Direct Realism
 Direct realists believe that mind-independent physical 
objects or material objects are sometimes perceived by sense. In 
saying that material objects are sometimes perceived by sense, 
direct realists are committed to saying that material objects are 
then perceived properly, and immediately. When direct realists 
properly and immediately perceive a material object, they say 
that the material object appears, seems, or looks, sounds, tastes, 
smells, or feels a certain way to a certain person. For example, 
when a direct realist perceives an apple, they will say that they 
see a material object that looks round, and red. This apple, as it 
is in itself or objectively, can exist unperceived by any mind. 
The direct realist however cannot say that they perceive 
an apple that is round and is red without being only arbitrary. 
Without an appeal to reason, there is no non-arbitrary way to 
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claim that the senses provide us with anything but mutually 
incompatible accounts of some property of a physical object. 
The way an object looks is relative to a perceiver and thus any 
way the object looks has just as good a right to be considered 
the real way the material object is as any other way the object 
looks. But this would be absurd, a determinate and unchanging 
material object cannot be composed of mutually incompatible 
properties. If any way the material object appears to us is the 
presentation of the objective material object, we could only 
be mediately aware of it because we have to reason which 
immediately perceived appearance can exist independently of 
a perceiver. But, as direct realists are committed to the claim 
that they perceive material objects without inference, they 
cannot claim a material object is a certain way only by sense, 
because it would entail an appeal to reason or an inference, or 
else would be only arbitrary. Thus, direct realists believe that 
they perceive material objects by sense which appear a certain 
way to them, but they do not know how the material object is 
in itself objectively, when unperceived. And, whatever criterion 
the direct realist appealed to for ascertaining the true qualities 
of the physical object  could itself be challenged, for whatever 
reason one person gives seems no better than the criterion 
another gives. After all, we cannot discern whose unique 
perceptual apparatus is right for ascertaining the real qualities 
of an object, which object would appear different to everybody.
 The existence of hallucinations seems to present a 
significant challenge to anyone grappling with the philosophy 
of perception. In hallucination, what is immediately perceived 
is not a mind-independent physical object. If you were to take 
a hallucinogenic drug such as LSD, you could hallucinate 
a pink elephant existing in your visual field. Now, if I was 
suddenly bestowed with your precise perceptual faculties 
and perceptual position, perhaps because our brains/minds 
were placed in each other’s bodies, I would not experience 
pink elephants existing in my/your visual field, for I had not 
taken LSD. Thus, when we hallucinate, what we are aware of 
is not a mind-independent physical object. What we are aware 
of is something that is mind-dependent, being not perceived 
by sense, but wholly by the imagination. What we are aware 
of is then not a physical object because it does not exist in 
space. Given that we are direct realists, our hallucinations 
are therefore representations of mind-independent physical 
objects. Therefore, for direct realists, when hallucinations 
occur, what we are aware of are mind-dependent non-physical 
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representations of mind-independent physical objects which are 
perceived by the imagination. 
This is similar to the definition of sense data I gave in 
paragraph one, but subtly and importantly different. Sense data 
are immediately perceived by sense; however, hallucinations 
are not perceived by sense, they are perceived wholly by 
the imagination, and are thus immediately perceived by the 
imagination. Sense data are representations of a physical object 
existing in some relationship with their correlative sense data. 
The hallucinations we experience would not stand in such a 
relationship, the pink elephant I see while hallucinating is not a 
mental representation of a pink elephant existing roughly in the 
place I seem to see it. It seems therefore, that assuming direct 
realism is true, the existence of hallucinations is something like 
a purely mental image. When we use our imagination to picture 
a blue rectangle, there is a mental image that is a blue rectangle 
immediately perceived by the imagination. This is what a direct 
realist can say happens in cases of hallucination, we perceive 
mental images just like we do in any direct application of 
the imagination, except that it is not due to our own volition 
that the mental images in hallucinations appear to us, like the 
occurrence of mental images normally is. Rather, the application 
of our imagination during hallucinations is something similar to 
the unconscious application of our imagination in our dreams.
 Although the existence of hallucinations does not force 
the direct realist to accept the existence of sense data, like 
many philosophers have thought in the past, the existence of 
hallucinations provides a significant epistemological challenge 
for the direct realist. As Dicker put it, “the Argument from 
Hallucination… should not be regarded as an attempt to 
demonstrate that there are sense-data… the argument should 
be regarded as yet another way of calling attention… to… 
an epistemological problem concerning perception.” The 
problem becomes evident if we accept direct realism as true, 
for, anytime we perceive something, I ask, can we ever know 
if that thing is not mind-dependent? If we sometimes perceive 
things that are mind-dependent mental images, but we cannot 
distinguish them from anything we perceive in veridical 
perception without an appeal to inference, then we can never 
know that we perceive material objects, or something that is 
not wholly dependent on our mind. Further, if direct realism is 
true, the streamlined argument from perceptual relativity that I 
presented shows that whenever we do perceive material objects, 
we do not know how they are in themselves or objectively, but 
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rather, some object with we know not what qualities appears a 
certain way to us. It would seem therefore, that we never know 
if or when we perceive mind independent objects, due to the 
existence of hallucinations, and even if we did, we would not 
know what they were like, due to the existence of perceptual 
relativity. Thus, although direct realism is not metaphysically 
inconsistent, its holder is plunged into perhaps the deepest 
epistemic skepticism imaginable.
Indirect Realism
 Indirect realists believe that mind-independent physical 
objects or material objects are perceived mediately by sense, 
while only mind-dependent non-physical representations 
of these physical objects termed sense data are immediately 
perceived by sense. In saying that physical objects are 
not perceived immediately by sense, the indirect realist is 
committed to saying that material objects are justifiably inferred 
to exist from the sense data they perceive immediately. The 
supposition of sense data is supposed to help deal with the 
epistemological challenges presented to the direct realist. And, 
the supposition of the existence of mind-independent physical 
objects is supposed to make the existence of the immediate 
objects of perception (i.e. sense datum) more probable. An 
indirect realist will often infer the existence of physical objects 
in the likeness of the sense data they perceive immediately by 
sense to help explain the existence of the immediate objects of 
sense perception. When an indirect realist perceives an apple, 
they will often say that they see a sense datum that is round, 
and red, and which consequently gives them reason to suppose 
that there is a physical apple which is round, and red, that we 
perceive indirectly, insofar as it resembles its correlative sense 
datum. This apple, as it is in itself, or objectively, can exist 
unperceived by any mind, however the sense data cannot, as 
sense data exist necessarily in an object-perceiver relationship.
 In saying that the sense datum is round, and red, the 
indirect realist is not being only arbitrary, for the way that 
sense data seem to us is the way that they are. The indirect 
realist accepts the principle that “if X appears F to S, and F is 
an irreducibly phenomenal, wholly perceptible quality, then S 
immediately perceives a sense datum that is F.” Thus, since the 
apple appears or looks round and red, and since roundness and 
redness are properly perceived, and because the only things 
that are properly perceived are irreducibly phenomenal, wholly 
perceptible qualities, the sense datum actually is round and red. 
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However, in saying that the physical object or apple is round, 
and red, the indirect realist is not being only arbitrary, as the 
indirect realist is making an inference. The indirect realist is 
reasoning that the physical object is like the sense datum which 
they perceive immediately by sense. However, the indirect 
realist is fallible in their conjecture because they do not know 
how the physical object is with certainty. They can only make 
an educated guess as to how the material object is in itself; but 
since they are not immediately aware of the physical object, 
they can never know how the object is in itself. Thus, like the 
direct realist, whatever criteria the indirect realist gives could 
itself be challenged.
 The existence of hallucinations presents a challenge to 
indirect realists, though it is less so a problem for the indirect 
realist than to a direct realist. What we are aware of in a 
hallucination is not a physical object because it does not exist 
in space. However, what we are aware of in hallucinations can 
be phenomenally indistinguishable from what we perceive in 
veridical perception. Thus, for indirect realists, without the 
application of reason it seems we cannot distinguish between 
whether we are perceiving a sense datum which represents 
a physical object by sense, or rather a hallucinatory image, 
which for an indirect realist I will call a mental image. I call 
it a mental image instead of a regular sense data because it is 
perceived wholly by the imagination, and not by sense. There 
are some who would call the objects perceived in hallucinations 
sense datum, but the term ‘sense datum’ implies that there is 
a physical object which is mediately perceived when a sense 
datum is perceived. However, during hallucination, like while 
in a dream, no physical object is perceived at all; ergo to call the 
object of perception in hallucination a sense datum would be 
erroneous. I therefore conclude that the object of hallucinatory 
perception is merely a mental image.
 The indirect realist has the advantage over the direct 
realist with regards to the existence of hallucinations because 
when indirect realists perceive something immediately, they 
can be sure that they are perceiving something immediately 
that is mind-dependent. The direct realist cannot know if 
they are perceiving something that is mind-dependent, or 
mind-independent immediately by sense, for they know 
not if they are perceiving either a physical/material object, 
or a mental image. The indirect realist, conversely, knows 
that they immediately perceive either a sense datum, or a 
mental image, both of which are dependent on the mind of the 
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perceiver. Unfortunately for the indirect realist, the existence of 
hallucinations still provides a difficult epistemic challenge that 
they must overcome. Whenever an indirect realist perceives, 
they can never know whether they perceive a physical object 
indirectly or not. Although the indirect realist knows the object 
of immediate perception is mind-dependent, and is in this sense 
in an epistemically privileged position in relation to a direct 
realist, they know not if there is really an object of mediate 
perception, i.e. a physical object in its place, wherever that may 
be.
 The indirect realist is, like the direct realist, bogged 
with at least two severe, epistemic, perceptual problems. In the 
first place, the indirect realist can never know whether they are 
perceiving a physical, material object or not due to the existence 
of hallucinations. Although the indirect realist can be certain 
that the direct or immediate object of perception will always be 
mind-dependent, they can never know if they perceive an object 
that exists independently of sense perception or not. Secondly, 
even if the indirect realism was true and we could sometimes 
infer the existence of material objects we perceive mediately, 
we could never know with certainty what the physical object 
looked like. 
Berkeley also pointed out that an indirect realist does 
not know how mind-independent (material) objects could 
produce mind-dependent qualities (sense datum). Neither do 
we know how material objects could act upon mind, nor do we 
know how a mind-independent object could imprint a sense 
datum on our mind, especially if the sense datum is not like 
the object. Further, we would have the same reason to believe a 
material object exists whether it did or not, as is evident by the 
existence of hallucinations or dreams. It seems therefore, that 
the existence of sensible qualities is not better explained by the 
existence of mediately perceived material objects, because an 
indirect realist does not know how a material object could cause 
sense data. The problems of perception and mind seem to make 
indirect realism epistemically unattractive.
Ideal Realism
Ideal realists believe that everything that is perceived 
are ideas, which exist only in the mind. I define ideas as 
irreducibly phenomenal, wholly perceptible, mind-dependent 
qualities. Ideas are perfectly known, as they contain nothing 
in them besides for how they appear to our mind. However, 
there are two types of ideas, being mind-dependent physical 
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objects termed ‘sensations’ or ‘real things’ which are perceived 
by sense, and mind-dependent non-physical representations 
of mind-dependent physical objects termed ‘thoughts’ or 
‘images of things’, or ‘mental images’ which are perceived 
by the imagination. Sensations or real things are properly 
and immediately perceived, being imprinted on the senses. 
Thoughts or images of things are either immediately, or 
mediately perceived, being perceived mediately by the senses 
or immediately by the imagination. When thoughts are 
suggested to the imagination by sensations which are properly 
and immediately perceived, they are mediately and improperly 
perceived by sense, and represented by the imagination. 
When thoughts are not suggested to the imagination, but are 
perceived wholly by the imagination, they are immediately 
perceived by the imagination, being not suggested or inferred 
to exist. Thus, when an ideal realist perceives an apple, they will 
say that they see a sensation or physical object that is round, 
and red. This apple, as it is in itself, or objectively, cannot exist 
unperceived by any mind. 
 In saying that the apple is round, and red, the ideal 
realist is not being arbitrary. The way that physical objects 
appear for ideal realists is the way that they are. The ideal 
realist accepts the principle that “if X appears F to S, and F is 
an irreducibly phenomenal, wholly perceptible quality, then 
S immediately perceives a sensation that is F.” Thus, since the 
apple appears or looks round and red, and since roundness 
and redness are properly perceived, and because the only 
things that are properly perceived are irreducibly phenomenal, 
wholly perceptible qualities, the apple actually is round and 
red. Ideal realists therefore believe that they perceive sensations 
by sense which appear a certain way to them, and this is 
how the physical object is in itself or objectively, because all 
physical objects are the way that they appear to us. Thus, for 
an ideal realist, there is no problem of perceptual relativity, for 
everything that is perceived is an idea that is a certain way, 
unlike a direct realist who can never tell when they perceive 
the true qualities of the object, and unlike an indirect realist 
who can never tell to what extent, or even if their sense data 
resembles its correspondent object.
 The existence of hallucinations presents an epistemic 
challenge to ideal realists similar to the indirect realist, but 
it is less significant of a problem for ideal realists than it is 
for the indirect or the direct realist. What we are aware of in 
hallucinations is not a physical object because it does not exist 
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in immediate extended space. However, what we are aware 
of in hallucinations are phenomenally indistinguishable from 
what we perceive in veridical perception. Thus, for ideal 
realists, without the application of fallible reason, it seems 
we cannot distinguish between whether we are perceiving a 
physical object or sensation by sense, or rather a hallucinatory 
thought by the imagination. 
 Like the indirect realist, the ideal realist can always 
know that the immediate object of perception is mind-
dependent. However, the existence of hallucinations is less 
of a problem for the ideal realist than for the direct and 
indirect realists because direct and indirect realists can never 
be sure if they perceive something that can exist wholly 
unperceived at all. When a hallucinogenic sensible quality 
is perceived, something that is exclusively mind-dependent 
is perceived, as opposed to in veridical perception. But 
sometimes hallucinations are phenomenally indistinguishable 
from veridical perception. Thus, direct and indirect realists 
could never know if they perceive something that can exist 
wholly unperceived, regardless of it being perceived directly 
or indirectly. However, for ideal realists, they can always be 
sure that they perceive nothing that is mind independent, for 
ideal realists only perceive ideas, and ideas are wholly mind 
dependent qualities. And, although ideal realists may have 
difficulty distinguishing sensations from thoughts without the 
use of reason, they still know that however they are appeared 
to by ideas is how that idea really is, for the existence of an idea 
consists wholly in its being perceived.
Conclusion
 Although the existence of hallucinations provides an 
epistemic challenge to ideal realists, it is negligible compared 
to the epistemic challenge it provides to direct and indirect 
realists. Further, the epistemic challenge provided by the 
existence of perceptual relativity makes direct and indirect 
realism look further unattractive. That is because direct and 
indirect realists can never know how physical objects really 
are, even if and when they are perceived. This same point does 
not apply to ideal realists, who are aware of the way physical 
objects are when they are perceived. There is thus no problem 
of perceptual relativity for an ideal realist, for their ideas 
are perfectly known. Lastly, indirect realists have epistemic 
concerns regarding the mind body problem that appear 
impossibly to remedy. I conclude my essay by saying that if we 
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look at the facts, ideal realism provides the most consistent and 
least paradoxical view regarding epistemic knowledge and the 
philosophy of perception, and as such should be considered 
more likely true. 
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